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SUBJECT: EU COUNCIL ON NATO-EU RELATIONS

Classified By: USEU External Affairs Officer Andrew Erickson
for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

Summary

1. (C) EUR/RPM Director Dan Russell visited Brussels May 6-7 to meet with EU Council Secretariat officials responsible for EU European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) formulation. The primary topic of discussion was the transition in Bosnia from SFOR to a EU mission. In all of his meetings, Russell drew upon the interagency-cleared guidance prepared for the May 5 PCG-PMG meeting on Bosnia. Russell met with Council deputy director general for ESDP Pieter Feith and exchanged views on NATO-EU relations. Council Secretariat planner Matthew Reece briefed Russell on the EU General Concept, and subsequently, Russell reviewed U.S. thinking on Bosnia with Council Defense Aspects Director Claude France Arnould. EU officials expressed confidence that things are generally "on track" for Bosnia, although the Council continues to have concerns about the Dayton authorities, strategic reserve arrangements, and the delineation of tasks, primarily monitoring. Finally, Russell met with EU Civilian Crisis Management Director Michael Matthiessen, and discussed the EU's military liaison with SHAPE with Major General Jean-Pierre Herreweghe, EU Military Chief of Staff. Herreweghe told Russell that the EUMS was staffing up its SHAPE liaison office, and would have approximately 10 officers in place at SHAPE by early June. These officers would also serve liaison roles at AFSOUTH and Sarajevo, as required. End summary.

Council Secretariat
- Feith and Arnould

2. (C) EUR/RPM Russell met May 6th with the Council Secretariat Deputy Director General for ESDP, Peiter Feith.

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Feith reviewed the current EU state of play on Bosnia with Russell, underscoring his view that things were going well. There continued to be some unease in the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) about NATO's lead role in detaining PIFWCs; Feith suggested that PSC ambassadors be briefed (ideally during their next trip to SHAPE) in order to better understand the way that PIFWCs are currently addressed in Bosnia. Russell took Feith's suggestion under advisement, and agreed to follow up with SHAPE to see if something could be done to put the PSC in the comfort zone on this issue. One key point to emphasize, said Russell, was that NATO is simply seeking to protect an on-going program, not carve out something from EU control. Feith responded that there was a real need to educate the PSC on this point. On NATO's counterterrorism role, Feith expressed satisfaction with Russell's explanation of the U.S. position.

3. (C) Next Russell met with Council Secretariat Defense Aspects Director Claude France Arnould, who reviewed EU concerns about control of strategic reserves in the event of a major conflagration in Bosnia following an EU takeover. Arnould's concerns seemed to be based upon a military-theological fixation with worst-case scenarios. Russell noted that outstanding reserve questions needed to be addressed and suggested that the U.S. was taking a pragmatic approach to planning. In general, he suggested that there was a need to establish a framework and then let military commanders work out the best approach to practical problems at the military-to-military level in the field. Politics simply complicated the pragmatic solutions required for a successful transition in Bosnia. On the Dayton authorities, Arnould suggested that the EU might require a new SOFA to meet its legal needs. Russell, noting that neither he nor Arnould were lawyers, stated the SOFA embedded in Dayton offered the best terms and the U.S. opposed reopening Dayton. Arnould agreed that the embedded SOFA offered the right terms, but continued to insist that the EU may need a new SOFA.

Bosnia General Concept

14. (C) Matthew Reece, Defense Aspects Planner, briefed Russell on the EU's General Concept for Bosnia, recently endorsed by the EU Council. Reece was principally responsible for drafting the general concept. In particular, Reece underscored three concerns for the EU as it moved towards a possible operation in Bosnia:
-- NATO's responsibility for PIFWCs;
-- the significance of NATO's retention of a role in the war on terror; and,
-- the necessity to go to the NAC for a decision to mobilize strategic reserves for an EU-led Bosnia Operation under Berlin Plus.

15. (C) Russell pushed back hard on all three points. It was a misunderstanding of NATO's position to say that its continued PIFWCs role was undercutting the EU; it was merely preserving the current approach to the problem. Regarding counter terrorism, NATO did have a vital role to play, which did not threaten the EU. Finally, reserve issues obviously remained to be worked out, but the EU needed to understand that a decision to draw on NATO strategic reserves -- following a process that would have already entailed bringing considerable operational reserves into play -- would absolutely require a NATO decision. NATO, of course, had the final voice in the dispensation of its own resources. Reece also took the opportunity to discuss the Dayton authorities and the delineation of tasks. In response to Russell's point that both EUFOR and the post-SFOR NATO force would require full Dayton authorities, Reece expressed concern that the EU should have the lead on monitoring. Most of his concerns on Dayton focused on making clear EUFOR's lead role in Bosnia.

EUMS Liaison at SHAPE

16. (C) On May 7, Russell met with Major General Jean-Pierre Herreweghe, EU Military Staff (EUMS) Chief of Staff (COS). Herreweghe expressed confidence that planning for Bosnia was proceeding in good order, although he was unwilling to express full confidence that the EU force generation process would be successful. Solana's plan was to hold an "informal" force generation conference first to try to get an idea of the forces that might be available, and the shortfalls needing to be addressed. After Istanbul -- and a formal NATO decision -- a formal process would begin, leading first to a CONOPS that could then lead to force generation.

17. (C) Herreweghe told Russell that the EUMS currently had three officers serving in the liaison cell at SHAPE; these officers were holdovers from the EU's "Operation Concordia". Herreweghe said that he is now sending five more officers to SHAPE, and said that these officers would be in place in the coming weeks. His goal by early June, he told Russell, would be to have 10 officers staffing the SHAPE liaison cell full time. On the question of seconding EUMS officers to AFSOUTH and Sarajevo, he said that this would be inappropriate, given the fact that SHAPE would be the EU's OHQ for the Bosnia Operation. For the EUMS to send liaison officers to AFSOUTH and Sarajevo would be to second-guess the OHQ at SHAPE, he said. For this reason, it was the EUMS liaison office at SHAPE that would determine coverage of AFSOUTH Naples and Sarajevo, and the officers would be rotated from the EUMS liaison cell at SHAPE for these jobs.

18. (C) Russell noted that another key issue was NATO and U.S. facilities in Bosnia, and the need for the EU to make a determination about what it would need. Herreweghe responded that he was going to see EUCOM General Wald on Monday May 10 at Wald's request in Stuttgart; he expected that EUCOM's need for more rapid EU planning on what facilities it would take over from NATO might be on Wald's agenda. Herreweghe reiterated the General Concept's position that EUFOR planned to initially deploy to SFOR's existing headquarters.

Civilian Crisis Management

19. (C) Finally, Russell reviewed the EU's civilian crisis management with Michael Matthiessen, director of the civilian crisis management cell of the EU. Matthiessen reviewed the EU's police headline goal, of 5,000 police officers of whom up to 1,400 can be deployed in under 30 days. Matthiessen underscored that the focus of the EU's police missions was non-executive policing; in other words, enhancing the capacities of national/local police forces to improve their own policing. Currently the EU was fielding police missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, and was deploying to the Congo in a follow-on mission to EU autonomous ESDP operation "Artemis". Regarding the police/gendarmie elements available to the EU's possible military operation in Bosnia, Matthiessen noted that such forces (called "IPU"s -- in EU parlance, for "integrated police units", the equivalent of NATO "MSU"s or "multinational specialized units") were

integrated with the military; this integration was their great advantage in post-crisis deployment.

110. (C) Responding to a question from Russell on the EU's police role in Afghanistan, Matthiessen noted that there had been considerable German opposition to an EU police role in Afghanistan for some time. It was SRSG Francesco Vendrell's call for an EU police advisor that had weakened German resistance to the idea of an EU role in this sector. The Germans were now considering how to develop an EU presence in Afghan policing, perhaps with Germany as lead nation. The Italians, Matthiessen reported without offering specifics, were interested in "a more ambitious approach".

Comment

111. (C) The consistent message from the EU Council Secretariat officials on Bosnia was that things are on the

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right track, although some concerns remain, notably on reserves and the Dayton authorities. Herreweghe's report on progress towards EUMS liaison at SHAPE, if confirmed by events, is good news, and shows that the EU is beginning to get things moving in the right direction.

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